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Abstract—Solar power has emerged as one of the three most
widely installed renewable energy sources around the globe.
Photovoltaic (PV) capacity in excess of 150 GW had been installed
in 2013 already, and many more installations are connected to
worldwide power grids every day; especially in the form of small-
scale PV plants in domestic environments. However, in order
to connect PV installations to the power grid, their dc output
must be converted to the nominal mains voltage and frequency
through the use of converters. In this paper, we propose a novel
approach to influence the maximum power point tracking (MPPT)
component of such a PV converter in order to enable two main
privacy-preserving operations: Firstly, by deliberately reducing
the output power through changing the converter’s operating
point, appliance operations can be emulated in order to pretend
user presence during periods of absence. Secondly, by running
the converter below optimum output power, and feeding real-
time data of an appliance consumption to the device, it is able
to hide the appliance’s operation from the household’s aggregate
consumption. We present simulations results that prove how our
modified converter design can hide appliance load signatures as
well as how it can be used to emulate appliance signatures to
falsely indicate user presence.
I. INTRODUCTION
Striving for sustainability has led to the global installation of
renewable power generation [1], mostly based on the conversion
of photovoltaic (solar radiation), hydroelectric (water motion),
or wind power to electric energy. Domestic photovoltaic instal-
lations especially contribute to the sustainable power supply
of many countries worldwide, given the simplicity of their
installation and their operability without the need for cen-
tralized coordination. However, their connection to the power
grid is complicated by the intermittent nature of the physical
phenomenon underlying PV generation, i.e., solar irradiance,
as well as the fact that their output is dc whereas virtually
all power grids worldwide are designed to transport ac power.
As a consequence of these limitations, conversion devices
(converters and/or inverters) are needed to transform the dc
output to the nominal mains voltage and frequency, and thus
allow such renewable generation plants to be connected to the
power grid.
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(a) Power vs. voltage (Vpv) curves for dif-
ferent irradiance levels (BP65W module).
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(b) MPPT to maximize the dc-dc
converter’s output power.
Fig. 1. Maximum Power Point Tracking (MPPT) is used to control the dc-dc
converter such that it outputs maximum power.
The power output of a PV array strongly depends on the solar
irradiance level and the temperature of the environment, hence
it is generally required to continually adapt the array’s operating
point such that the output power stays maximal. One main
technological foundation for maximizing the output power of a
PV array is the use of Maximum Power Point Tracking (MPPT).
Let us briefly revisit its main principle as follows. Fig. 1a
shows the typical relation between PV voltage and output power
for different irradiance levels. Upon closer inspection, one can
observe that the peak output power is reached at different op-
erating voltages Vpv for different levels of irradiance. Adapting
the maximum power point (MPP) accordingly is thus crucial to
maximize the energy transfer and typically performed by dc-dc
converters, as shown schematically in Fig. 1b. For this reason, a
large number of MPPT algorithms, in both the digital or analog
domains and with different complexities, have been proposed
in the existing literature [2].
Changing the function of the MPPT component in order to
enhance user privacy is the core contribution of this work.
It is motivated by the existing research on load identifica-
tion [3, 4, 5, 6, 7], building classification and occupancy de-
tection [8, 9], and generally all solutions targeting to make the
user’s environment smarter through the analysis of electricity
consumption data [10]. While the main focus of these works
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is usually on the provision of novel user-oriented services,
they implicitly also result in privacy issues, e.g., enabling the
identification of lifestyles [11] or behavioral patterns [12].
Our key approach on enhancing user privacy is the controlled
modification of the PV converter’s operating point to help us
obfuscate existing loads as well as to inject false load signatures
into a household’s aggregate consumption. As PV converters
are generally equipped with MPPT algorithms, it is easily
possible to retrofit them with our solution and thus make them
tools for a better protection of user privacy in smart grids. We
make the following contributions in this work:
• We highlight threats to user privacy resulting from the
disclosure of smart meter data, as well as surveying
existing means to mitigate these issues.
• We present conceptual and technical details about our
modified MPPT algorithm, which allows the external
control of the converter’s power point in order to inject
load signatures into a household’s aggregate consumption.
• We evaluate how our algorithm responds to requested
power changes when generating fake load signatures as
well as when hiding the operation of an appliance.
This paper is structured as follows. We introduce privacy
threats resulting from the disclosure of unprocessed smart
meter data in Sec. II, along with a discussion of related work.
Subsequently, we outline our contribution in more detail in
Sec. III and evaluate its accuracy and response times in Sec. IV.
Finally, we conclude this paper in Sec. V.
II. PRIVACY THREATS AND RELATED WORK
Along with the increasingly ubiquitous online connectivity
and the manifold opportunities enabled through connecting
objects to the Internet, the societal awareness for privacy has
grown measurably in the past years [13].
A. Privacy Threats of Smart Metering
While the secure transmission of meter readings has already
been enforced at early deployment stages of smart meters [14],
no such provisions exist for maintaining user privacy. In fact,
technical means to ensure that collected data are exclusively
used for billing are absent; today, customers need to trust their
utility company to maintain the confidentiality of collected data
and not release them to untrusted parties. The availability of
consumption data collected by means of smart meters leads to
numerous threats to user privacy. The most prominent threat
results from the emergence of Non-Intrusive Load Monitoring
(NILM) more than two decades ago [15]. This landmark idea of
disaggregating household energy consumption into individual
contributions has evolved into a widely addressed research
challenge, and numerous researchers have presented methods to
extract the presence as well as operational times of individual
appliances from a home’s aggregate consumption [3, 4]. How-
ever, consumption data needs to be considered highly sensitive,
as it paves the way for targeted advertisement (e.g., inform-
ing customers about inefficient appliances), user profiling and
household classification [8], and many others.
B. Existing Protection Approaches
The vast majority of current works on protecting user privacy
in smart grids either focuses on security-enhanced data trans-
mission solutions (i.e., applying information security solutions
to transfer readings to an assumed trustworthy utility company)
or collaborative approaches to exchange meter readings be-
tween different customers [16, 17]. In such approaches, values
aggregated across different homes are often being used to
achieve k-anonymity, i.e., the unlinkability between appliance
operation and the actual dwelling (out of the k potential ones)
in which it has taken place. Other solutions to tackle this
issue can generally be categorized as (1) the anonymization
of meter data [18], (2) the privacy-preserving aggregation of
meter data [19], and (3) the masking and obfuscation of meter
data [20, 21]. This work is concentrating on the latter category,
and we hence discuss existing works in the domain of load
hiding as follows.
Solutions for the obfuscation and masking of meter data can
be divided into load hiding using a battery and load hiding
based on controllable loads. A battery-based load hiding system
charges and discharges a battery at strategic times to flatten
the household’s energy demand. Ideally, all rapid changes in
power demand should be covered by the battery to flatten the
energy consumption observed by the smart meter [22], and
thus obfuscate characteristic consumption patterns which can be
used to infer user and/or appliance activity. Several algorithms
have been proposed in the field of battery-based load hiding
in [20], such as non-intrusive load leveling (NILL) and the
stepping framework.
In contrast to battery-based approaches, load hiding tech-
niques can also employ dedicated appliances with large power
consumption, such as a water boiler, to obfuscate the power
demand. One such approach towards load-based load hiding
is presented in [7]. To protect user privacy, the water boiler is
randomly turning on and off with the constraint to meet a given
daily power consumption. This addition of noise to the overall
household power demand has been shown to strongly decrease
the success rate of NILM algorithms. Another work [23]
uses a thermal energy storage of large elastic heating loads
to fake power profiles of other appliances in homes. This
technique does not aim to prevent against load disaggregation
techniques, but instead tries to inject the load profiles of typical
home activities into the aggregate consumption. Accordingly,
it successfully prevents occupancy detection techniques [9].
C. Comparing our Approach to Existing Work
Our work differs from related work in two main regards:
Firstly, all existing load hiding approaches rely on adding
electrical devices (e.g., a water boiler or a battery) to consume
power on demand. This implies a monetary cost to purchase,
install, and maintain these devices. Our approach relies on
a device that is already present in domestic PV installations
and thus alleviates this burden. Secondly, existing approaches
generally intentionally consume power (e.g., by activating a
water boiler) or convert it to different types of energy (e.g.,
chemical energy stored in a battery) which entails conversion
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losses, often radiated in the form of thermal energy. Our
solution instead modifies the PV converter such that power is
not being generated in the first place. As our proposed deviation
from the MPP does not lead to any (mechanical or electrical)
degradation of the PV panels or the power electronics in PV
converters, the solution has no negative technical side effects.
III. CONCEPT AND IMPLEMENTATION
The core idea of our work is to intentionally lower (or
raise) photovoltaic generation in order to create signatures in
a household’s aggregate power consumption which did not
originate from the actual operation of electrical appliances.
Controlling a converter’s MPPT algorithm can be used to
intentionally deviate from the MPP, and thus represents a
viable basis for realizing our concept. Moreover, PV generation
curtailment directed by utilities has also been proposed to deal
with voltage rise issues in distribution networks with high PV
penetration [24].
A. Conceptual Considerations
Our system design is driven by two main applications, both
of which can be achieved when modifying the output power of
a small-scale domestic PV installation:
1) The generation of artificial appliance signatures (similar
to the notion of load-based load hiding, as discussed in
Sec. II-B). This approach can, e.g., be used to simulate
user presence even when no persons are physically there.
Besides mitigating the risk of burglaries, artificial sig-
natures also make it harder for attackers to determine a
user’s typical habits and daily activities.
2) Hiding existing loads through increasing PV generation.
To this end, the PV generation must be set to an output
power below its maximum capacity prior to the requested
operation, such that the instantaneous increase of its
generation becomes possible by replaying the inverse
consumption of an appliance, i.e., increasing PV genera-
tion linearly with the appliance’s demand.
An important consideration to make when modifying power
consumption readings is to decide whether smart meters should
be allowed to report values that differ from the actual con-
sumption. As such an approach would, however, defeat their
primary purpose (i.e., billing and supporting more fine-grained
capacity planning), we do not follow such a strategy. In other
words, no changes are required to the smart meter as long
as it reports the total aggregate consumption of a dwelling
(i.e., Pconsumed−Pgenerated). This, however, also implies that
generation and load need to be connected to a single meter and
that our approach is inapplicable when generation and load
measurements are performed separately, as the unprocessed
load data with all its sensitive detail is reported to the utility
company in this case.
Operating a PV installation below its MPP is a necessary
requirement for our load hiding approach, yet it implies that less
power is converted than possible. While this can be expected
to lead to lower returns from the sales of energy to the grid
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Fig. 2. Single-stage, single-phase PV inverter with the proposed power tracking
control.
operator, we believe this is a reasonable monetary cost to bear
as the price of privacy.
B. Overall Architecture and Implementation Details
MPPT algorithms are omnipresent in state-of-the-art PV
converters. Their operation is based on tracking the peak of the
PV curve under given irradiance and temperature conditions. It
is hence mandatory for our system to know about the relation
between Vpv and the resulting output power P in order to
achieve a controlled reduction or increase in PV generation. We
currently achieve such knowledge through the implementation
of pre-defined lookup tables that map the relations between
known irradiance and temperature values to a known power
output behavior. Alternatively it would also have been possible
to iteratively adjust the operating point in a closed loop until
the desired change in the converter’s output power has been
observed. However, the limited rate of change would make it
impossible to model rapid power consumption changes (which,
e.g., occur when turning on a capacitive load) in the converter’s
output power, and we have thus decided against this approach.
In the long run, we strive for a more adaptive solution, such
that curves with multiple extremal values, e.g., as a result of
partial shading conditions, can be appropriately modeled (cf.
Fig. 3 for an example of the actual PV output on one such
day).
A schematic of the single-stage, single-phase PV system
used in our models and simulations is shown in Fig. 2 with
the relevant system parameters given in Table I. The system
consists of a single-phase full-bridge inverter connected to
the ac grid through an LCL filter. The converter performs
MPPT by regulating the dc voltage to the required level. Our
proposed system is based on a modification of the Incremental
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Fig. 3. Excerpt of the PV generation on a cloudy day (starting time 7.00am).
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TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
Grid voltage (Vg) 230 V
Grid frequency (f ) 50 Hz
Switching frequency (fsw) 20 kHz
DC link capacitor (C) 2 mF
VMPP (at 1000W/m2) 17.6 V
IMPP (at 1000W/m2) 3.69 A
Vopencircuit (at 1000W/m2) 22.1 V
Ishortcircuit (at 1000W/m2) 3.99 A
Conductance algorithm [25], a widely used solution to realize
MPPT. The main novelty of our modification relies on the
addition of an external input signal to the power point tracker,
such that an intentional deviation from the MPP becomes
possible. In the resulting MPPT algorithm, the peak of the
power is tracked by operating at the point where dP/dVpv = 0
for the curves of Fig. 1a. In order to deviate from the MPP, we
force the algorithm to operate at a point where dP/dVpv < 0,
with the exact value defined by the PV curve and the required
deviation from the MPP.
It needs to be noted that the maximum output power of
the PV array under given environmental conditions is the
limiting factor in the injection of simulated load signatures
and load hiding. More precisely, our approach can only be
used during times when sufficient PV generation exists (i.e.,
it has limited use during occluded skies and is inapplicable
during the night) to simulate or hide appliance signatures.
Moreover, quickly changing environmental conditions require
the parallel execution of MPPT and the forced injection of
deviations from the optimum power point. In such situations,
deterministically predicting the converter’s response during
simultaneous variations of these two input parameters remains
an open challenge.
IV. EVALUATION
In order to assess the performance of our solution in terms
of its success of generating simulate appliance load signatures
and hiding actual appliance operations.
A. Evaluation Setup
We have conducted simulations of a grid-connected PV
converter with the modified MPPT algorithm using MAT-
LAB/Simulink and PLECS. The following sections outline the
simulated setup and selected result demonstrate both modes
of operation. All input data were fed to the system at a
resolution of 1 Hz, identical to the sampling resolution of state-
of-the-art power monitors like the Plugwise [26] system. Our
system includes a single-phase, single-stage PV inverter which
connects the PV array to the power grid through an LCL filter.
The solar array consists of two strings, each composed of 22
BP365 modules (rated at 65 W each) in series. Characteristics
of the PV modules and the PV inverter are also tabulated in
Table I. Tracking of the MPP is achieved by controlling the
voltage of the dc-link to the required value while a linear PI
controller is used for the control of the converter current.
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Fig. 4. Demonstration of the response times when setting the converter’s
desired output power (0.02 ms temporal resolution on the x-axis).
B. Controlled Power Point Shifting
As a first result, we demonstrate how the intentional devia-
tion from the converter’s power point is reflected in its output
power. To this end, we have configured the modified MPPT
algorithm to stepwise reduce the converter’s output power every
10 seconds; the result is visualized in Fig. 4. The diagram
shows that response to the requested deviation from the MPP
are almost instantaneous and mainly depend on the frequency
at which MPP changes are processed. Minor oscillations are
observed after each transition, which indicate a change of the
converter’s power point. However, their amplitudes are highly
similar regardless of input and output power level, hence they
do not allow an attacker to draw conclusions about whether
a large or small change to the converter’s output power has
been requested. Both fast response times to requested output
power changes and the inability to infer the amplitude of power
changes are vital elements in using our approach to protect user
privacy, and both of them are fulfilled.
C. Simulating Appliance Load Signatures
Having demonstrated the solution’s ability to quickly respond
to requested output power changes, we now investigate how it
is able to simulate appliance signatures without these devices
being operated in practice. As introduced in Sec. III-A, the first
use case is based on reducing the converter’s output power, and
its practical use cases include pretending user presence and
adding load signatures for appliances not physically owned,
e.g., to confuse an attacker. In order to simulate appliance
operation, the corresponding load signatures are required as
inputs to our modified MPPT algorithm, and such traces have
been extracted from the Tracebase data set [6]. In the following
evaluations, we use both a trace for both a larger consumer
(a toaster oven; 800 W peak power consumption) and a rather
small appliance, namely an LCD television set with peak
consumption of 150 W.
The results for simulating the load signatures of these two
appliance types are shown in Fig. 6. We have set the oper-
ational duration of the appliances to 30 seconds, in order to
observe the MPPT algorithm’s behavior during output power
transitions better. Retaining the appliance’s usual operational
durations (e.g., minutes or even hours for the TV) is nonetheless
possible; neither the behavior during the transition times nor the
one during steady-state operation change when extending the
operational times.
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(a) Simulated toaster load signature.
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(b) Simulated LCD TV load signature.
Fig. 5. Load simulation is realized by injecting existing load signatures (e.g.,
from a pre-defined library) into the converter’s MPPT algorithm.
Analysis of the figures confirms that the converter’s output
power drops for the duration of the appliance operation, and re-
turns to nominal level afterwards. Although an (approximately)
one-second delay can be observed before the input stimulus
is observed at the converter’s output, this commonly does not
represent a problem when simulating loads (in comparison
to load hiding where instantaneous compensation of loads is
highly desirable, cf. Sec. IV-D). In conclusion, our simulation
results allow us to conclude that injecting load signatures into a
household’s aggregate load is easily possible through our pro-
posed method. The signatures required to perform this operation
can be easily extracted from previous appliance operations (e.g.,
by means of plug-level power sensors) or simply downloaded
from publicly available data sets. In terms of monetary cost,
the operation of a simulated appliance is equally expensive as
the actual appliance’s operation (assuming identical tariffs for
generated and consumed electricity).
D. Load Hiding
In the previous evaluation, we have used our modified MPPT
algorithm to simulate loads which were not present in a home.
In this part, we now assess at which accuracy the second
required mode of operation, namely load hiding (cf. Sec. III-A),
can be performed. To realize load hiding, the converter’s output
power needs to be increased by the same amount as the load’s
consumption rises. This is vital to maintain the same household
total consumption, Pconsumed − Pgenerated, as before the start
of the appliance activity. Assuming an instantaneous response
and an accurately controllable converter output, load signatures
can effectively be hidden from the household aggregate power
consumption this way, and no sensitive details are released to
the utility company or other third parties.
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(a) Hidden toaster load signature.
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(b) Hidden LCD TV load signature.
Fig. 6. Load hiding is realized by injecting real-time measurements (e.g.,
collected by means of plug-level meters) into the converter’s MPPT algorithm.
In practice, however, it is not possible to reduce all delays
to zero, as the collection and transmission of appliance power
consumption, as well as its processing in order to set the
converter’s operating point take up time. We present results of
load hiding operations for the toaster and the LCD television
appliances in Fig. 7, where a one-second delay can be observed
between the recording of power data and its use in the PV
converter’s power tracking algorithm. Note that this delay
dominates the load hiding accuracy, whereas the oscillations
observed after transitions (cf. Fig. 4) could not be determined
to measurably contribute to the latency.
In the two diagrams, the dashed line in the bottom part
represents the actual consumption of the appliance, as measured
by means of a plug-level meter. Assuming no load hiding was
taking place, this additional consumption would be directly
visible in the household aggregate load, and thus pose risks to
user privacy through the use of NILM (cf. Sec. II-B). In order
to alleviate these issues, our load hiding approach increases
generation (through the same adaptation of the converter’s
power point as used before) by the same extent as the load’s
power draw. The dash-dotted line in the figures shows the
output of the PV generation when our MPPT-based load hiding
approach is being used. By increasing generation when the
load increases, the resulting total consumption (the continuous
line in the diagrams) does not reveal amplitude information
about the underlying appliance’s load signature. Instead, only
very short (2–3 seconds) power spikes can be observed in
the transition regions, which result from the non-zero delays
between appliance load metering and the corresponding setting
of the converter’s power point.
As a final observation, this way of load hiding requires
households to run their PV systems at a lower power in order
to gain the ability to increase generation on demand. We need
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to remark, however, that it is not necessary to run the PV
array at sub-optimum operating points throughout an entire
day. Knowledge of typical appliance operation times can be
exploited to reduce PV power ahead of the expected appliance
operation (e.g., by using data similar to Fig. 3 as an input
to simulate appliance load signatures before the anticipated
appliance operation), and thus only gain the required generation
capacity when needed.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Protecting user privacy in an increasingly digital world
becomes more and more important. With the mandatory de-
ployment of smart metering infrastructure in many countries
across the globe, sensitive information about activities and
daily workflows is delivered to the utility company without
adequate protection. We have proposed a novel way to leverage
domestic PV installations to achieve privacy protection, namely
by intentionally reducing the power generation in order to
simulate user presence and appliance load signatures. The only
price to pay when using our approach is the cost of temporarily
generating less or no PV power; a small price to pay in order
to prevent the release of sensitive information.
Our approach neither leads to an (electrical or mechanical)
degradation of the PV panels nor of the converter, and as such
can be easily deployed at large scale. Our practical evaluations
have shown that the delays between setting a desired output
power and the converter’s reaction is almost instantaneous.
Even when feeding data collected from appliance monitoring,
observed delays mostly result from the transfer of power sensor
readings from the appliance monitor to the converter. Overall,
adaptation delays of less than 2 seconds can be achieved on
average, and as such only short consumption spikes occur
in the household aggregate consumption. They, however, they
lack appliance-specific features and thus disaggregation, i.e.,
finding out from which appliance they originated, is much more
complex.
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